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Preserving History or Property Values: Historic Preservation and Housing Prices 
in Washington, DC 
Abstract 
Neighborhood historic preservation has been highly controversial in Washington, DC, as proponents claim 
it preserves valuable architecture and critics claim in increases unaffordability. Using a dataset of all 
residential and condominium property sales in DC between 1992 and 2019, I find that the effect of 
historic designation on property values within historic districts is heterogeneous. While residential 
property values increase by 9%, condominium prices fall by 6.3% after designation. This paper also 
uniquely controls for endogeneity—which arises if in response to rising housing prices, neighborhood 
groups seek historic designation—by researching the party that nominated each historic district. 
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1 Introduction 
 Since 1950, the District of Columbia has designated 37 neighborhood historic districts 
with each recent decade bringing another 6 to 9 new designations. Now, 4.2% of all residential 
properties in DC reside in historic districts. The designation requires property owners to seek 
approval from the Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB) before renovating or 
demolishing their properties. Since the HPRB often forces property owners to renovate in 
accordance to the historical character of the house, the DC government provides subsidies to low 
income families to pay for costly home repairs.  
 Neighborhood historic preservation has been highly controversial in Washington, DC. 
Proponents argue that historic architecture is a public good that needs protection from developers 
that do not internalize its external benefits. Increasing tourism, promoting the city’s culture, and 
improving neighborhood cohesion are the main positive externalities claimed by preservation 
activists. They also fear that economically and politically powerful real estate developers 
threaten DC’s architectural history and culture as demand for housing in the city booms.         
 Opponents of neighborhood historic preservation argue that restricting property-owners 
rights to redevelop their properties reduces the supply of housing, pushing housing costs upward 
and exacerbating a crisis of unaffordability. At the extreme, critics claim that preservation locks 
a city in its past, reducing its competitive advantage as new cities emerge in the United States 
and around the world (Glaeser, 2010). Critics also argue that preservation has regressive 
distributional effects by creating quaint, centrally located neighborhoods only available to 
wealthy property owners while pricing out low income groups.  
 Reflecting the public controversy over historic preservation, the policy has multiple 
offsetting effects on property values within historic districts. The loss from nearly eliminating the 
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option to redevelop restricts homeowners’ ability to maximize the value of their properties, 
driving the value of properties inside historic districts down. On the other hand, the designation 
fixes the supply of housing at pre-designation levels, as well as preserves the positive 
externalities from historic properties—both effects push housing prices upward. Thus, the effect 
of historic designation on housing prices is theoretically ambiguous, and ultimately an empirical 
question.  
 This paper empirically tests the effect of historic preservation on property values and 
finds that the policy increases property values inside of designated districts: controlling for 
housing and neighborhood characteristics, historic designation increases property values inside 
of historic districts by 9%. The effect of historic designation differs by building type, however. 
While residential properties such as single-family homes and townhouses increase in value by 
9%, condominium prices fall by 6.3% due to historic designation. The results also show that 
there are no statistically significant spillover effects of historic preservation; more specifically, 
properties within 250 feet of a historic district that are unaffected by policy’s constraints on 
renovations but benefit from the positive externalities associated with neighborhood preservation 
saw no change in housing prices due to historic designation. The lack of spillover effects 
suggests that the externalities of historic preservation are small, at least to those living in the 
neighborhood. These results are robust to model specification, sample selection, and rigorous 
repeat-sales models. As policymakers continue to designate neighborhoods as historic districts in 
Washington, DC, they should take into account its unintended effects on housing prices.  
2 Literature Review 
Current literature produces mixed results of the impact of historic designation on housing 
prices, reflecting the theoretical ambiguity of the policy’s net effects. Summarized in Table 1, the 
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existing literature covers a variety of US cities, indicating that the effects of historic preservation 
may differ considerably when interacted with specific local housing markets and government 
regulations. Previous literature tests the effect of historic designation on property values within 
historic districts (internal effect). Some studies test for spillover effects—that is the effect of 
historic designation on property values just outside of the historic district’s boundary (external 
effect). My research supports the most robust finding in the literature: that historic designation 
increases property values within historic districts but has insignificant spillover effects.  
Most studies seek to improve the methodology to mitigate the omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity that plague analyses on the effect of historic designation on property values. 
Traditional hedonic models—the standard for real estate economists—rely on deep datasets of 
housing characteristics (i.e. square footage, number of bedrooms) to isolate the determinants of 
housing prices. However, in determining the effect of historic designation, hedonic models 
cannot control for the difficult-to-quantify historic significance of a property, which is surely 
correlated with historic district designation.  
Out of concern for omitted variable bias in hedonic models, more recent studies limit the 
sample to repeat sales to control for unobservable historical qualities of a property (Noonan, 
2007; Noonan, 2011; Heintzelman & Altieri, 2013; Been, Ellen, Gedal, Glaeser, & McCabe, 
2016; Oba & Noonan, 2017). Repeat sales models estimate the effect of historic designation on 
the change in property values sold twice—thus controlling for all the time-invariant 
characteristics of a property. Removing omitted variables comes at the cost of drastically 
reducing sample size. Repeat sales analyses can also introduce bias if properties that sell more 
frequently are not representative of the entire housing stock. Noonan (2007) and Been et al. 
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(2016) use both hedonic pricing models and repeat sales models for robustness, while Noonan 
(2011), Heintzelman and Altieri (2013), and Oba and Noonan (2017) rely solely on repeat sales.  
Previous literature has employed a variety of approaches to control for endogeneity bias, 
which arises if rising housing prices lead neighborhood groups to seek historic designation. 
Noonan (2011) uses an instrumental variable approach with the interaction of historical quality 
and neighborhood demographics. Been et al. (2016) analyze the pre-designation pricing trends 
between historically designated districts and nearby neighborhoods and conclude that there is no 
evidence of diverging trends. Oba and Noonan (2017) conduct a deep dive into model 
specification and conclude that the model should control for neighborhood-specific price trends 
via an interaction term between a dummy variable for each neighborhood and a dummy variable 
for each sale year.  
Although historic preservation policies differ considerably by city, my results that 
historic designation increases property values by 9% with insignificant spillover effects 
compares well to existing literature. Employing a repeat sales model with neighborhood trend 
fixed effects, Oba and Noonan (2017) find historic designation increases property values by 
12.1% in Atlanta. Been et al. (2016) use a hedonic pricing model with neighborhood trend fixed 
effects to find historic designation increases property values by 16.7% in New York City. 
Heintzelman and Altieri (2013) find that historic designation decreases property values in Boston 
by 11.6 to 15.5% using a yearly fixed effects model of repeat sales. Noonan and Krupka (2011), 
Heintzelman and Altieri (2013), and Oba and Noonan (2017) all find insignificant spillover 
effects. Only Been et al. (2016) find significant positive spillover effects using repeat sales or 
neighborhood trends models. 
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This study makes three substantial contributions to the existing literature. First, I propose 
a novel way to control for endogeneity by limiting the sample to historic districts that were 
nominated by activist organizations. In contrast to neighborhood groups and local government 
offices, non-profit architectural and historical organizations are significantly less likely to seek 
out neighborhood historic designation in response to rising housing prices. Research into the 
nomination process can help identify which districts are most likely exogenous. Second, I find 
that the effect of historic designation is heterogenous across housing type; specifically, while 
single-family homes and townhouses see a 9% increase in value after historic designation, 
condominiums fall by 6.3% in value. Thus, heterogeneity in housing characteristics explains 
some of the variation in the effects of historic designation on property values. This result 
complements recent research that finds that neighborhood heterogeneity explains some of the 
variation in the effect of historic designation (Been et al., 2016). Third, this study is the first to 
analyze the effect of historic designation on property values in Washington, DC.   
3 Neighborhood Historic Designation in Washington, DC 
 Georgetown was designated as the first historic district in Washington, DC in 1950. At 
the time, the process of historic designation only required approval from the Council of the 
District of Columbia (Gale, 1991). In 1966, the National Historic Preservation Act required 
federal review of all historic designations by the Joint Committee on Landmarks until a local 
review board was established (Gale, 1991). Petitions requesting neighborhood designation 
increased after the Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB) was created in 1983, which is 
comprised of 9 board members appointed by the mayor. Board members must have a strong 
background in one of the following disciplines: “history, prehistoric and historic archaeology, 
architectural history, and architecture” (Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, 
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1978). Between 1950 and 2018, 37 neighborhood historic districts were designated, and 6 
historic districts were expanded.  
 Table 2 shows that 84 percent of historic districts are located in the Northwest, but the 
HPRB has designated neighborhoods in all of DC’s quadrants except for the Southwest, which is 
the smallest. Nine percent of historic districts are in the Northeast, while 7 percent are located in 
the Southeast. One historic district, Capitol Hill Historic District, spans across both the Northeast 
and the Southeast. The timing of historic districts has been fairly constant between 1970 and 
2018, with each decade bringing 6 to 9 new historic districts or expansions. The location of 
historic districts designations has generally moved eastward, as all 4 historic districts in the 
Northeast were designated between 2010 and 2018. Figure 1 shows that even within the 
Northwest, newer historic districts are located further east.  
 Of all residential properties in DC, 4.2% are located within historic districts. Historic 
districts vary significantly in size and in number of residential properties. The average historic 
district is 0.183 square miles and contains 1310 residential properties. Capitol Hill historic 
district is the largest spanning 1.167 square miles and containing 7,797 residential units. The 
smallest historic district is Emerald Street, which is 0.004 square miles and contains 173 
residential units. Neighborhood historic districts span a range of neighborhood types, from 
Massachusetts Avenue historic district, comprised of the major road and only 5 residential 
properties, to Anacostia historic district located in residential southeast DC. 
3.1 The Designation Process 
 Property owners and neighborhood advisory councils are not the only parties eligible to 
nominate a neighborhood for historic designation. Government agencies (such as the HPRB and 
the Historic Preservation Office) and preservation activists can also nominate neighborhoods for 
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designation and are often heavily involved. The nominating party is not required to inform 
property owners of its application for historic designation. After the city receives a nomination 
for historic district designation, all development projects in the neighborhood are stalled, and no 
building permits are issued.   
 After nomination, the HPRB holds a public hearing to determine if the neighborhood 
should be designated as a historic district. By law, the HPRB’s decision only depends on the 
historical significance of the neighborhood, but the public has an opportunity to comment. HPRB 
member, Brain Crane, made this point clear to the residents of Bloomingdale who spoke out 
against historic designation during the public hearing: 
I want to reflect that the way this board is constituted under the laws and regulations of 
the District is that our authority is very specifically limited, that we are, as I understand it, 
to consider the nomination that is before us according to the criteria for historic properties 
in the District of Columbia and the National Register of Historic Places. And that’s pretty 
much it...We have no expertise in and have no authority to weigh concerns about the 
economic impact. I hear those concerns, I understand them, but this board was not 
created to hear those concerns; there are other venues where those concerns can be 
addressed. 
Likewise, while public comment is very important and it’s good to hear the various 
arguments that the public have for and against the nomination, we are not empowered to 
count votes (Crane, 26 July 2018).  
 
Thus, endogeneity only arises through the nomination process, not at the hearing itself. 
Establishing that the nomination for historic district was exogenous is a sufficient criterion to 
determine that the ultimate designation was also exogenous to housing price trends. At the end of 
the hearing, the HPRB votes to designate the neighborhood, and if approved, the designation 
becomes effective immediately.  
3.2 The Restrictions Designation Imposes 
 After a neighborhood is designated as a historic district, all external renovations to a 
property require approval from the Historic Preservation Office (HPO). “Minor and routine 
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work” such as repairing fences or roofing can be approved within one or two days. More 
extensive work, including replacing the doorknob on the front door, require a full HPO review. 
The full HPO review process, in short, begins with an application for renovations complete with 
photos and diagrams of the proposed renovations filed by the property owner to the HPO. HPO 
staff then personally visit the property and write an official report on the renovation. At this 
point, the application can be permitted, denied or forwarded to the monthly HPRB meeting. If a 
renovation requires a full meeting, the applicant presents before the HPRB and the HPO staff 
summarize their report. The HPRB votes on the proposal, and if approved, the applicant can go 
forward to pursue a traditional building permit (Historic Landmark and Historic District 
Protection Act, 1978).  
4 Descriptive Statistics 
 To estimate the effect of historic designation on property values, I combine a series of 
administrative datasets available at Open Data DC, a government data-sharing website. The 
Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal – Residential (CAMAR) dataset contains every residential 
property in DC, as well as the price and sale date for residential property transactions between 
1992 and 2019. Additionally, CAMAR contains all the property characteristics used in the 
hedonic price regressions. The Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal – Condominium (CAMAC) 
contains the same information for all condominium sales between 1992 and 2018. The CAMAC 
data omits a few of the property characteristics available in the CAMAR data, such as the 
number of kitchens and the condition of the property. I merge the CAMAR and the CAMAC 
datasets with the Address Points dataset, which specifies the specific latitude, longitude, and full 
address for every Square Suffix Lot (SSL) in DC. SSL values are based on the land associated 
with a property, which uniquely defines every residential property in the CAMAR dataset. The 
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condominiums in the CAMAC dataset do not contain a corresponding lot value. Thus, I assign 
each condominium the lot at the center of its corresponding square, where a square is equivalent 
to a single city block. Since historic districts do not split blocks, this assumption does not affect 
the variable of interest: which condominiums are inside of historic districts.  
For the location of historic districts, I obtain the Historic Districts dataset also from Open 
Data DC. I limit the Historic District data to neighborhood historic districts, omitting designated 
parks and government areas. However, the Historic Districts dataset contain only the 2018 
boundaries, which have been expanded 6 times in varying years. To account for these 
expansions, I review the Boundary Increase Registration Forms available at the National 
Register of Historic Places. In 3 cases these forms include a map of the boundary extension, 
which I digitize onto the Historic Districts dataset. The other three cases only provide a verbal 
description of the extension, which I trace manually onto the Historic Districts dataset. I further 
match the nomination date for each historic district from the DC Inventory of Historic Sites 
database. 
Using GIS methods, I identify properties within historic districts. For all properties 
outside of historic districts, I calculate the distance to the nearest historic district. I also calculate 
the distance to the nearest metro station entrance for every property in the dataset, accounting for 
when the metro station was constructed. As expected, properties sold in historic districts tend to 
be older than those outside of historic districts. Properties in historic districts also tend to be 
condominiums or townhouses as opposed to single-family homes which are more prevalent 
outside of historic districts. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 
property transactions within historic districts between 1992 and 2019. Table 5 shows the 
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descriptive statistics for the full sample of property transactions outside historic districts between 
1992 and 2019. 
4.1 Repeat Sales 
 While the CAMAR and CAMAC datasets only contain the most recent sale, I retrieve 
older versions of the CAMAR and CAMAC datasets to identify properties that sold repeatedly. 
The benefit of the repeat sales model is that by measuring price changes in the same property, the 
model controls for all time-invariant locational and property-specific characteristics of a 
property. The cost is a significant drop in the number of observations. After dropping all 
properties that were remodeled between the two sales and cleaning the data for outliers, I identify 
3,653 repeat sales across the two datasets. I follow Oba and Noonan’s (2017) methodology, 
who’s repeat sales model contains only 2,451 observations, to identify properties that sold before 
and after historic designation. Table 6 shows that 1.8% repeat sales (65 properties) experienced a 
change in historic designation between sales.  
 The repeat sales model also controls for changes in the sale year, season, and historic 
designation of buffer areas (descriptive statistics shown in table 6). The older CAMAC and 
CAMAR datasets contain all property sales between 1992 and July 2018. As a result, most of the 
repeat sales are recent sales in the second half of 2018 and early 2019. However, the new data 
was also updated from previous years to include an additional 200 to 250 repeat sales per year 
between 1999 and 2017. The seasonal and yearly changes variables are measured as -1 for the 
initial sale, 0 for no sale, and 1 for final sale.  
5 Methodology 
 Historical designation limits redevelopment and eliminates new construction in a 
neighborhood. Designation influences property values in many ways. First, the lost option to 
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redevelop a property decreases the land value that the property sits on. Owners value the option 
to redevelop, especially if the property is well below the initial zoning cap, and willingness to 
pay for a property decreases when this option is taken away. Second, there are positive 
externalities from living in aesthetically appealing neighborhoods. If a neighborhood is initially 
very aesthetically beautiful, as historic districts likely are, eliminating the neighbors’ ability to 
tear down their old stone houses to build large, modern condominiums preserves the distinctive 
character of the neighborhood. Third, since housing is a durable good, maintenance costs factor 
into a consumer’s willingness to buy property. Designation strictly regulates properties’ 
structural repairs, increasing maintenance costs, which push housing prices downward. Fourth, 
DC has a local grant program to subsidize low-income families in historic districts that seek to 
improve or repair exterior features of historic homes. This subsidy may increase housing values 
in historic districts, similarly to how a local tax break would increase property values in a 
neighborhood. Fifth, designation eliminates the option to build new housing, making the supply 
of housing in the district perfectly inelastic. An exogenous increase in demand for housing in a 
designated neighborhood cannot be offset by equilibrium effects, as developers cannot enter the 
market and increase the supply of housing. Theoretically, perfectly inelastic supply only 
increases the severity of price shocks and has an ambiguous effect on housing prices depending 
on the direction of demand shocks. However, in DC demand for housing has steadily increased, 
creating a strong presumption that inelastic supply of housing causes higher housing prices in 
designated neighborhoods.  
 Isolating the precise impact these effects have on housing prices is complicated because 
instead of being randomly selected, historic districts are meticulously chosen. Historic districts 
are designated precisely because of their unique historic character and significance. My hedonic 
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regression will be unable to pick up certain architectural characteristics that may make homes in 
historic districts more valuable regardless of official designation. This omitted variable is 
concerning, and I control for it in two ways. First, I use extensive longitudinal data with many 
observed home sales in historic districts before designation. By including a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a home was sold in a neighborhood that ever became a historic district, I isolate the 
effect of the designation itself. I also conduct a repeat sales analysis that estimates the effect of 
historic designation on the change in price of the same property sold twice, thus automatically 
holding these time-invariant historic characteristics constant. 
  The historic district designation process may also be endogenous to housing price trends. 
If in response to rising housing prices, neighborhood organizations seek historic designation to 
ensure that developers cannot drastically change the character of their neighborhoods, the rising 
housing prices caused historic designation, not the other way around. Neighborhood 
organizations both actively nominate their neighborhoods for historic designation and likely 
lobby local government officials as well. Since the HPO is overseen by elected councilmembers, 
the local government’s decision to nominate a neighborhood for historic designation reflects the 
views of their constituents. Thus, designation is largely endogenous to housing price trends. 
I control for endogeneity by testing the effect of historic designation on housing prices 
for a subsample of historic districts nominated by activists. After reviewing applications to 
nominate neighborhoods as historic districts, I find that neighborhood groups authored only 7 of 
the 39 available nominations. Activist groups nominated 19 neighborhoods, government 
agencies nominated 13, and 2 designations did not provide nomination documentation. The 
activist groups are all nonprofit organizations that focus on architecture and history. The DC 
Preservation League nominated the most historic districts, closely followed by the Historic 
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Preservation Service of Colorado. Compared to neighborhood organizations and the DC local 
government, activists are significantly more likely to only consider the historic quality of a 
neighborhood in their nomination decisions. In fact, two historians affiliated with the George 
Washington University nominated Bloomingdale as a historic district in 2018. Activist-
nominated historic districts are significantly more likely to be exogenous than government- or 
neighborhood-nominated historic districts are. As discussed in section 3.1, establishing that 
historic districts are exogenously nominated is sufficient to assume that the designation itself is 
also exogenous.  
5.1 Hedonic Pricing Model 
 To determine the effect of historic designation on residential property values in DC, I 
estimate the following hedonic housing price model:  
   ln𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑇𝑗 + 𝛿𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  (1) 
Where the dependent variable is the natural log of the price of property i in census tract j in year 
t. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of time-invariant property characteristics including the number of bedrooms, 
square footage, distance to nearest metro, etc. (full list in tables 4 and 5). 𝐶𝑇𝑗 is a set of dummy 
variable fixed effects at the census tract level. 𝐼𝑗𝑡 is a set of neighborhood specific time trends, 
with each census tract j interacted with each sale year t. 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a set of historic district variables. 
𝑖𝑡 is the mean zero random error term. The model controls for heteroskedasticity and clusters 
standard errors at the census tract level.  
 The 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 vector contains a variable 𝐻𝐷 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 that equals 1 if a property sale is located 
within a historic district, before or after designation. By including 𝐻𝐷 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟, the model controls 
for the unobservable differences between homes within and outside of historic areas absent 
official designation. 𝐻𝐷 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a property sale is located in a 
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historic distract after (post) designation. The coefficient on the 𝐻𝐷 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 variable estimates the 
effect of designation on property values. I interact the 𝐻𝐷 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 variable with each of the 
building types to determine if the effect of historic designation changes whether the property is a 
townhouse, single-family home, or condominium.  
 I also estimate spillover effects for homes that benefit from the positive externality of 
historic preservation, but do not face the policy’s constraints on development. The 𝐵𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 
dummy variable in the 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 vector takes the value of 1 if a property sale is within 250 feet of a 
historic district, both before after designation. While 𝐵𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a property is sold within 250 feet of a historic district after designation. I set the buffer 
distance to 250 feet because that is approximately the distance of one city block in Washington 
DC and is approximately equal to the buffer distances used by Been et al. (2016) and Oba and 
Noonan (2017).  
5.2 Repeat Sales Model 
 To ensure robustness, I also estimate a series of repeat-sales models which control for all 
unobservable qualities in a property. Separating the effect of historic designation from a 
property’s inherent historic qualities is essential for eliminating omitted variable bias in 
estimating the impact of historic designation on prices. The major downside of repeat sales 
models is that they drastically reduce sample size.  
 The repeat sales model takes the first difference of the simple hedonic pricing model 
between the two sale dates t and s (where t > s).  
   ln𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑇𝑗 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  (2) 
   ln𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑇𝑗 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠𝛿𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝑖𝑠  (3) 
   ∆ln𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿∆𝐼𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡∆𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡  (4) 
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Where 𝜃𝑖𝑡 is 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑠. By first differencing equation 2 from equation 3, the repeat sales model in 
equation 4 removes all time-invariant variables. The dependent variable, ∆ln𝑃𝑖𝑡, shows the 
difference in the log price of property i sold at times s and t. All property characteristics and 
time-invariant census tract fixed effects cancel out. The ∆𝐼𝑡 variable is the time elapsed between 
the initial sale and the final sale. Following Oba and Noonan (2017), I also include yearly and 
monthly dummy variables where the initial sale, no sale, and final sale take on the values of -1, 
0, and 1, respectively. The 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑠 variable is a dummy variable if the property was in a historic 
district during the initial sale, and its coefficient 𝜏𝑠 allows properties in historic districts to 
appreciate at a different rate between the two sales. The ∆𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if a property was not located in a historic district during the initial sale but 
was located in a historic district during the final sale. Its coefficient 𝜏𝑡 shows the effect of 
historic district designation on home prices. Like the hedonic model in 5.1, I interact the ∆𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡 
variable with each building type to allow the designation to affect building types differently.  
6 Results 
 My preferred model—the fixed-effects, repeat-sales model that includes only activist-
nominated historic districts—shows that historic designation increases property values by 9%. 
The effect is heterogenous across building types; in fact, condominiums fall in value after 
historic designation by 6.3%. There is no evidence of statistically significant spillover effects of 
historic designation. These results are robust to model specification and sample selection.  
6.1 Hedonic Pricing Model 
 Table 7 shows the regression results for the hedonic pricing model. To identify the effect 
of historic designation, all models include an HD post variable to measure the effect of historic 
designation on property values. Following Been et at. (2016), all models control for 
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neighborhood trends, which interact each sale year with each census tract, controlling for a host 
of locational, time-variant omitted variables associated with housing prices. Activist-nominated 
HD models only include historic districts nominated by activists, controlling for endogeneity. 
Residential only models include additional property characteristics not available in the 
condominium data, such as the number of stories, kitchens, and the property’s condition, which 
further control for possible omitted variables. Additionally, residential only models may better 
isolate the effect of historic designation if the relationship between other control variables 
depends on if a property is a condominium or a residential home. For example, the marginal 
effect of adding a bathroom to a condominium, which are typically smaller and have fewer 
bathrooms, is larger than the marginal effect for a bigger, single-family home. The results reflect 
these diminishing marginal returns on bathrooms as the coefficient falls 4 to 5 percentage points 
in residential only models.  
 In all models the HD post variable is positive and statistically significant at the 95% 
level, suggesting that historic designation increases property values between 10.7 and 14.5%. 
The effect of historic designation falls by 1.4 to 3.8% in the activist-nominated HD models, 
indicating that endogeneity biases the estimates upward but cannot explain the entire the increase 
in property values from historic district designation. Surprisingly, the HD ever variable is neither 
consistently positive nor statistically significant. However, the consistently positive sign on the 
HD ever variables in activist-nominated HD models, compared with their consistently negative 
signs for the all HD models, may suggest that properties in historic districts nominated by 
activists have more historical qualities than those in neighborhood- or government-nominated 
districts, leading to a price premium even before designation.  
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 The interaction terms between the HD post variable and each building type show that the 
effect of historic designation affects condominium prices significantly less than other building 
types. The interaction terms should be interpreted as the marginal effect of the building type on 
the HD post variable. Thus, model 2 shows that condominium prices fell by 1.9% after historic 
designation, and this difference is statistically significant at the 99% level. None of the other 
interaction terms are significant in any of the models, suggesting that condominiums are 
uniquely affected by historic designation, while all other building types increase in value.  
The coefficients on the buffer ever and buffer post variables are also neither consistently 
positive nor statistically significant across models. Historic designation appears to have 
insignificant spillover effects. This result is robust to interacting the Buffer post 250f variable 
with each building type. The coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs and are 
consistent with the literature. A 1% increase in the square footage of a property increases the 
property value between 2.37 and 4.6%. Been et al. (2016) find a similar effect, with a 1% 
increase in the square footage leading to a 3.7% increase in property value. Increasing the 
number of bedrooms or bathrooms or adding a hardwood floor all increase the value of the 
property. A property in excellent condition sells for 6% more than properties in good condition 
(the omitted category), and properties in poor condition sell for 35% less. All models explain 
over 83% of the variation in the log price of a property. 
 6.2 Repeat Sales Model  
 Table 8 shows the results of the repeat sales models, which better control for property-
specific omitted variable bias. The coefficient on the ∆𝐻𝐷 variable shows the marginal effect of 
historic designation, holding the historic quality of a property constant. Following Heintzelman 
and Altieri (2013), the fixed effects models controls for the ∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒, ∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 and census 
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tract fixed effects. The neighborhood trends models interact the ∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 variable with each 
census tract (Oba and Noonan, 2017). The neighborhood trends specification better controls for 
time-variant neighborhood characteristics at the cost of drastically reducing the degrees of 
freedom. Due to limited observations in the repeat sales dataset, I prefer the more parsimonious 
fixed effects models.  
The coefficient on the ∆𝐻𝐷 variable is positive in all four models, but only retains 
statistical significance in the first three. Across the repeat sales models, historic designation 
increases property values between 3.9 and 10.6%. As expected, the coefficients on the ∆𝐻𝐷 
variable are slightly lower in the repeat sales models than they are in the hedonic models, likely 
reflecting the omitted variable bias associated with a property’s unquantifiable historic quality. 
Also, both the coefficient on the ∆𝐻𝐷 variable and its statistical significance fall when limiting 
sample to historic districts nominated by activist groups, further supporting the conclusion that 
including neighborhood- and government-nominated historic districts overstates the effect of 
historic designation due to endogeneity. Model 2 best controls for both omitted variable bias 
(through the repeat sales model specification) and endogeneity associated with the nomination 
process (through limiting the sample to historic districts nominated by activist groups) while 
preserving degrees of freedom. Therefore, my best estimate is that historic designation increases 
property values by 9%.  
This effect is not uniform across building type. The ∆𝐻𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜 interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant across all four models, suggesting that condominium prices 
fall between 6.3 and 9.7% from historic designation. Similar to the hedonic models, I also test 
interaction terms between the ∆𝐻𝐷 variable and the other building types. I find highly 
insignificant effects for every other building type and remove the interaction terms from the 
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model to preserve degrees of freedom. The result that historic designation causes condominium 
prices to fall is robust across model specification and subsamples.  
 The repeat sales models also support the conclusion that historic designation has 
insignificant spillover effects. The coefficients on the ∆𝐵𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 250𝑓 variable for both model 
specifications are insignificant and change signs. Interaction terms between the ∆𝐵𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 250𝑓  
variable and each building type are all insignificant and were removed from the model. The 
coefficient on the HD always variable shows that properties in historic districts appreciate faster 
than properties outside of historic districts, but the coefficient is only significant in the fixed 
effects model with all HDs.  
6.3 Discussion  
 The findings in sections 6.1 and 6.2 offer a broad view of the many dimensions of 
historic district policy in DC. The immediate and most robust result is that historic designation 
increases housing prices by 9%, and that this effect is severely mitigated for condominiums. One 
possible explanation for the divergence in residential and condominium prices because of 
historic designation is that individuals’ preferences to live in a historic neighborhood strongly 
correlate with their preferences to live in a historic house. Since condominiums tend to be newer 
and less historically significant than townhouses and single-family homes in historic districts,1 
individuals that buy condominiums may systematically derive less utility from historic 
architecture than those who buy townhouses or single-family homes. If individuals that prefer to 
live in a historic district also have strong preferences to own a historic home, then the value 
historic properties should increase more than all other properties after historic designation. 
Individuals that care little about historic value may simultaneously prefer to buy condominiums 
 
1 The median residential property is 28 years older than the median condominium.  
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and find the higher maintenance costs associated with historic districts outweigh the benefits of 
historic preservation. This analysis suggests that differences in individuals’ preferences for 
historic architecture explain the divergence in residential and condominium property values after 
historic designation. One alternative mechanism is that condominiums simply require more 
maintenance than residential homes, making the added regulatory requirement costlier. Future 
theoretical and empirical research should explore the determinants of the heterogeneous effects 
of historic designation on residential property values. 
 A second surprising result is that there appear to be no statistically significant spillover 
effects of historic designation. It is very intuitive that properties right outside of historic districts 
gain from the positive externalities associated with preservation, but face none of the constraints 
on renovations, and thus should see property values increase. This null result is consistent with 
the literature and warrants further investigation. It could suggest that there are fewer externalities 
from living in historic districts than previously thought, and individuals care more about 
consuming historically significant property than living near it. Alternatively, the boundaries for 
historic districts may stretch beyond the area of historical significance; thus, the spillover areas 
are too far from the properties that provide the largest positive externalities.  
 Taken together, the results show that intentional sample selection is critical for 
determining the effect of historic designation. The repeat-sales models show smaller effects of 
historic designation than traditional hedonic models, likely suggesting the presence of omitted 
variables associated with time-invariant, property-specific historic characteristics. On the other 
hand, repeat sales models can introduce bias if properties that sell more frequently are not 
representative of the entire housing stock. The models that only include activist-nominated 
historic districts also show smaller effects for every model specification and subsample, 
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suggesting the presence of endogeneity in the full sample of historic districts. Future researchers 
should carefully choose which historic districts to include in the sample by paying close attention 
to the designation process and incentives of those nominating historic districts.  
6.4 Caveats  
 There are two limitations to my analysis: (1) the effect of historic designation may be 
heterogenous across districts; and (2) the prevalence of spatial autocorrelation. Been et al. (2016) 
first identified that the effects of historic preservation are heterogenous and depend on a 
neighborhood’s initial level of development and aesthetic value. Testing the possibility of 
heterogenous effects of historic preservation in Washington DC would be a worthy area of future 
research. The problem with incorporating heterogeneity into the current model is the 
unavailability of data. Been et al. (2016) quantify each neighborhood’s initial level of 
development using FAR, which is the legal maximum size for each building in a 
neighborhood—clearly an imperfect measure of pre-designation level of development. This 
metric would not work for analyzing heterogeneity in Washington, DC, where residential zoning 
laws restrict height by the number of stories each property can have, not FAR. In conjunction 
with the city-wide building height limit, the maximum number of stories for a residential 
property has very little variation between neighborhoods and cannot be interpreted as the pre-
designation level of neighborhood development. The second independent variable to test for 
heterogenous effects is the pre-designation aesthetic value of a neighborhood, an even more 
challenging variable to quantify. An in-depth survey of neighborhood aesthetic valuations is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 In real estate, the importance of location cannot be overstated. Spatial autocorrelation, the 
phenomenon that properties that are closer to each other are more alike and affect each other, can 
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bias the results of repeat sales and hedonic pricing models (Oba & Noonan 2017). My spatial 
controls, clustering standard errors at the census tract level and controlling for neighborhood 
trends, are unable to fully control for biases associated with spatial autocorrelation. A more 
robust model would include a spatial weights matrix, where a property’s value depends on recent 
sales nearby as a function of distance to the initial property. However, a spatial weights matrix 
cannot account for differences in the time elapsed between nearby sales, which is why I prefer 
neighborhood-specific time trends. 
7 Conclusion 
 This paper sheds new light on the local housing market effects of neighborhood historic 
districts in Washington DC. The main finding that historic district designation increases property 
values by 9% supports critics concerns that the policy increases the cost of housing, exacerbating 
a crisis of unaffordability. However, the effect of historic designation differs by building type. 
While residential properties such as single-family homes and townhouses increase in value by 
9%, condominium prices fall by 6.3% due to historic designation. These findings are robust to 
sample selection to account for endogeneity and repeat sales that drastically reduce omitted 
variables. I cannot fully control for spatial autocorrelation, but I am comforted that the results are 
robust to standard errors clustered at the census tract level.  
 Admittedly, I do not offer a complete economic analysis of neighborhood historic 
preservation policy. Future research should quantify the positive externalities from neighborhood 
preservation for a more complete cost benefit policy analysis. Still, policymakers should take 
into consideration the upward pressure that neighborhood historic designation has on residential 
property values, which is not currently factored into the HPRB’s decision making. As more 
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neighborhoods are nominated for historic preservation, my analysis underscores the importance 
of taking housing costs into account. 
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Figure 1: Washington DC Historic Districts 
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Table 1: Literature Review 
Study Location Model Type 
Internal         
(% change) 
External        
(% change) 
Coffin (1989) Chicago Hedonic +6 to +7 — 
Asabere et al. (1994) Philadelphia Hedonic -24 — 
Clark and Herrin (1997) Sacramento Hedonic +17 -20 
Noonan (2007) Chicago 
Hedonic using 
Instruments 
-37 Insignificant 
Heintzelman and Altieri 
(2013) 
Boston Repeat Sales -11.6 to -15.5 Insignificant 
Been et al. (2016) New York 
Hedonic and 
Repeat Sales 
+16.7 +11.9 
Oba and Noonan (2017) Atlanta Repeat Sales +12.1 Insignificant 
Klarnet (2019) 
Washington 
DC 
Hedonic and 
Repeat Sales 
+9 Insignificant 
Note: the selected relevant literature is limited to studies that analyze the effect of local historic districts on observed 
property sales in the United States. This excludes studies on historic landmarks or individual properties, federal 
historic designation, studies that rely on appraisal data or analyze non-US cities.  
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Table 2: Historic Districts Descriptive Statistics 
  
Total Number 
of Districts 
Percentage of 
Districts 
By Time period and Designation 
1950-1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-2018 
Northwest 36 84 2 6 9 6 8 5 
Northeast 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Southwest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southeast 3 7 0 2 0 0 1 0 
Total 43 100 2 8 9 6 9 9 
% of total     5 19 21 14 21 21 
Note: these statistics group all 37 neighborhood historic designations and 6 expansions in Washington DC between 
1950 and 2018.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Historic Districts by Size and Parcels 
  Mean Sd p10 p25 Median p75 p90 
Size 
HD (sq 
miles) 
0.183 0.257 0.013 0.045 0.085 0.199 0.487 
Number 
of 
parcels 
1310.759 1673.317 140 321 633 1653 3774 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – All Residential Sales within Historic Districts 1992 – 2019 
  Mean Sd Median Min Max 
Price 
     
630,104.70  
     
418,753.10  
     
525,000.00  
         
9,000.00  
   
3,300,000.00  
Number of bedrooms 2.44 1.35 2 1 10 
Number of bathrooms 1.85 0.93 2 1 9 
Number of half 
bathrooms 0.42 0.54 0 0 5 
Square footage 1,351.49 703.52 1,200.00 360.00 4,267.00 
Lot size 1,077.60 1,108.46 782.00 11.00 11,600.00 
Age 50.12 33.61 43 0 195 
Year built 1930.78 41.03 1914 1765 2018 
Number of fireplaces 0.67 0.91 0 0 7 
Hardwood floor 0.46 0.50     
Metro within 250 meters 0.03 0.17     
AC 0.87 0.34     
Building type       
   Townhouse inside 0.32 0.47     
   Townhouse corner 0.08 0.27     
   Single-family home 0.03 0.17     
   Multi-family home 0.01 0.11     
   Semi-detached home 0.03 0.17     
   Condo 0.53 0.50     
Heating type       
   Forced air 0.35 0.48     
   Hot water radiator 0.22 0.42     
   Heat pump 0.25 0.43     
   Warm cool 0.16 0.37     
Residential only       
   Number of stories 2.30 0.48 2 1 5 
   Number of kitchens 1.42 0.65 1 0 4 
Condition       
   Excellent 0.00 0.06     
   Average 0.35 0.48     
   Good  0.54 0.50     
   Fair 0.01 0.09     
   Poor 0.00 0.03       
Note: Median, min, and max not shown for dummy variables. The mean represents the portion of dummy variables 
equal to one. N = 22,007.  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics – All Residential Sales outside Historic Districts 1992 – 2019 
  Mean Sd Median Min Max 
Price 450,504.10 328,229.10 376,582.50 4,850.00 8,243,685.00 
Number of bedrooms 2.76 1.23 3 1 10 
Number of bathrooms 1.86 0.91 2 1 8 
Number of half 
bathrooms 0.46 0.58 0 0 11 
Square footage 1,371.43 636.88 1,260.00 359.00 4,272.00 
Lot size 2,290.19 2,096.88 1,651.00 11.00 11,626.00 
Age 42.34 24.52 45 0 118 
Year built 1948.12 33.07 1940 1780 2018 
Number of fireplaces 0.46 17.40 0 0 4068 
Hardwood floor 0.63 0.48     
Metro within 250 meters 0.01 0.11     
AC 0.78 0.41     
Building type       
   Townhouse inside 0.24 0.42     
   Townhouse corner 0.07 0.26     
   Single-family home 0.21 0.40     
   Multi-family home 0.04 0.19     
   Semi-detached home 0.11 0.31     
   Condo 0.34 0.47     
Heating type       
   Forced air 0.42 0.49     
   Hot water radiator 0.25 0.43     
   Heat pump 0.14 0.35     
   Warm cool 0.18 0.38     
Residential only       
   Number of stories 2.03 0.35 2 1 4 
   Number of kitchens 1.21 0.63 1 0 6 
Condition       
   Excellent 0.01 0.12     
   Average 0.44 0.50     
   Good  0.42 0.49     
   Fair 0.01 0.09     
   Poor 0.00 0.04       
Note: Median, min, and max not shown for dummy variables. The mean represents the portion of dummy variables 
equal to one. N = 66,636.  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics – Repeat Sales 1992 – 2019  
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max Median 
∆price (log) 0.40 0.54 -2.84 5.14 0.27 
∆saledate (days) 2,742.09 2,187.25 30 9,875 2,198 
HD always 0.23 0.42     
∆HD 0.02 0.14     
Buffer 250feet always 0.04 0.19     
∆Buffer 250f 0.01 0.11     
∆spring -0.24 0.49     
∆fall 0.05 0.62     
∆summer -0.08 0.68     
∆saleyear 1992 -0.01 0.08     
∆saleyear 1993 0.00 0.07     
∆saleyear 1994 -0.01 0.08     
∆saleyear 1995 -0.01 0.08     
∆saleyear 1996 0.00 0.07     
∆saleyear 1997 -0.01 0.08     
∆saleyear 1998 -0.01 0.09     
∆saleyear 1999 -0.01 0.13     
∆saleyear 2000 -0.01 0.12     
∆saleyear 2001 -0.02 0.15     
∆saleyear 2002 -0.02 0.13     
∆saleyear 2003 -0.02 0.15     
∆saleyear 2004 -0.03 0.19     
∆saleyear 2005 -0.05 0.23     
∆saleyear 2006 -0.04 0.21     
∆saleyear 2007 -0.05 0.22     
∆saleyear 2008 -0.03 0.19     
∆saleyear 2009 -0.04 0.19     
∆saleyear 2010 -0.04 0.21     
∆saleyear 2011 -0.04 0.20     
∆saleyear 2012 -0.06 0.23     
∆saleyear 2013 -0.07 0.27     
∆saleyear 2014 -0.07 0.26     
∆saleyear 2015 -0.07 0.25     
∆saleyear 2016 -0.06 0.23     
∆saleyear 2017 -0.10 0.31     
∆saleyear 2018 0.60 0.65     
∆saleyear 2019 0.21 0.41       
Note: Median, min, and max not shown for dummy variables. The mean represents the portion of dummy variables 
equal to one. N = 3,653.  
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Table 7: Hedonic Model Results of Sale Price (log) on Historic Designation and Buffer Zones  
  Full Sample Residential Only 
  
(1)                    
All HDs 
(2)            
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
(3)                    
All HDs 
(4)            
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
HD ever -0.010 0.011 -0.018 0.042 
  (0.041) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) 
HD post 0.122*** 0.108*** 0.145*** 0.107** 
  (0.044) (0.028) (0.040) (0.042) 
HD post * Condo -0.115*** -0.127*** 
 
  
  (0.032) (0.007) 
 
  
HD post * Single family home -0.008 -0.069* 0.015 -0.008 
  (0.046) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028) 
HD post * Multi family home 0.094 0.123 0.043 0.053 
  (0.115) (0.276) (0.037) (0.034) 
HD post * Semi-detached home -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 0.010 
  (0.030) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023) 
HD post * Townhouse end 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.011 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Buffer ever 250f 0.48* 0.039** 0.011 0.011 
  (0.025) (0.017) (0.026) (0.034) 
Buffer post 250f -0.031 -0.026 0.024 0.032 
  (0.035) (0.020) (0.032) (0.041) 
Square footage (log) 0.460*** 0.458*** 0.237*** 0.239*** 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) 
Room -0.008* -0.008* -0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bedroom 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bathroom 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.0.60*** 0.059*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Half bathroom 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
  (0.04) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Land area (log) -0.058*** -0.051*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 
  (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Fireplace 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.040*** 0.042*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.0007 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 0.00004*** -0.00004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Condo -0.047 0.029    
  (0.123) (0.117)   
Single-family home 0.112 0.110 -0.012 -0.011 
  (0.111) (0.116) (0.048) (0.047) 
Multi-family home -0.291** -0.290** -0.198*** -0.185*** 
  (0.117) (0.117) (0.060) (0.061) 
Semi-detached home 0.051 0.045 -0.046 -0.046 
  (0.111) (0.117) (0.050) (0.047) 
(Table 7 continues onto the next page) 
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Table 7: (Continued) 
  Full Sample Residential Only 
  
(1)                    
All HDs 
(2)            
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
(3)                    
All HDs 
(4)            
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
Townhouse end 0.030 0.024 -0.038 -0.037 
  (0.115) (0.117) (0.012) (0.050) 
Hardwood floor 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Metro close 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.010 
  (0.026) (0.010) (0.024) (0.031) 
stories   0.018** 0.017** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
kitchens   -0.006 -0.008* 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Condition: Average   -0.261*** -0.261*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Condition: Excellent   0.060** 0.060** 
  (0.029) (0.029) 
Condition: Fair   -0.273*** -0.266*** 
  (0.090) (0.100) 
Condition: Default   -0.135*** -0.136*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Condition: Poor   -0.353*** -0.370*** 
  (0.090) (0.094) 
Constant 8.880*** 8.945*** 10.394*** 10.378*** 
  (0.203) (0.126) (0.127) (0.133) 
          
Number of Observations 88,741 82,001 54,433 51,947 
Adj R squared 0.830 0.830 0.888 0.888 
RMSE 0.304 0.305 0.262 0.261 
AIC 39983.238 38492.972 8500.756 7780.464 
Note: upper values are the coefficients, t-statistics shown in parentheses. Neighborhood trends models include 171 
census tract dummies interacted with each sale year. All models use robust standard errors clustered at the census 
tract level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Repeat Sales Regression of Change in Sale Price (log) on Historic Designation and 
Buffer Zones 
  Fixed Effects Neighborhood Trends 
  
(1)                       
All HDs 
(2)                          
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
(3)                       
All HDs 
(4)                          
Activist-
Nominated HDs 
HD always 0.058* 0.042 0.037 0.114 
  (0.032) (0.019) (0.142) (0.203) 
∆HD 0.106** 0.090* 0.056* 0.039 
  (0.052) (0.049) (0.031) (0.031) 
∆HD * Condo -0.185** -0.153** -0.142** -0.136* 
  (0.080) (0.064) (0.063) (0.076) 
Buffer 250feet always -0.087*** -0.082** 0.005 -0.009 
  (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.053) 
∆Buffer 250feet 0.019 -.040 0.001 -0.017 
  (0.078) (0.066) (0.055) (0.053) 
∆saledate 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆spring -0.016 -0.016 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆fall -0.020* -0.020* -0.010 -0.011 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
∆summer -0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.007 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.053 0.072 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.056) 
          
Number of 
Observations 3,653 3,568 3,653 3,568 
Adj R squared 0.424 0.421 0.551 0.550 
RMSE 0.314 0.298 0.314 0.298 
AIC 2467.342 2435.996 1186.386 1158.413 
Note: upper values are the coefficients, t-statistics shown in parentheses. Fixed effects models include census tract 
fixed effects. Neighborhood trends models include 171 census tract dummies interacted with ∆saledate. All models 
include change in year dummies and use robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level.                
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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